←IndexThe Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam

Lecture 5: The Spirit of Muslim Culture

Section 14 of 14

The critique of Spengler's 'Magian' thesis

Section summary

In brief

Iqbal closes the lecture by confronting Spengler's classification of Islam as 'Magian' and his thesis that cultures are hermetically sealed from one another. He concedes that a Magian crust has grown over Islam — indeed, stripping that crust is the purpose of the entire Reconstruction — but insists that Islam's radical monotheism and its doctrine of finality are a direct psychological cure for the Magian attitude of perpetual messianic expectation.

Section 13 delivered the philosophical climax of Lecture V: the anti-classical spirit of the Qur'an 'scores its final victory over Greek thought' in Ibn Khaldūn's conception of history as genuinely creative temporal movement — 'eternal recurrence is not eternal creation; it is eternal repetition.' Section 14 now closes the lecture by turning to address, head-on, the thinker whose thesis most directly contradicts the argument Iqbal has been building: Oswald Spengler, whose The Decline of the West classified Islamic civilisation as 'Magian' — a category that, in Iqbal's judgement, 'completely perverts' the vision of Islam as a cultural movement.

The section advances through three connected arguments. First, Iqbal states Spengler's thesis and identifies its strategic weakness. Spengler holds that each culture is 'a specific organism, having no point of contact with cultures that historically precede or follow it.' He acknowledges that European culture is anti-classical in spirit — but attributes this anti-classical spirit entirely to 'the specific genius of Europe,' denying any Islamic contribution. Iqbal concedes that Spengler's characterisation of modern culture's anti-classical spirit is 'perfectly correct,' but insists that 'the anti-classical spirit of the modern world has really arisen out of the revolt of Islam against Greek thought.' If this can be shown — and Iqbal believes the preceding thirteen sections have shown it — then Spengler's thesis of cultural incommensurability collapses.

Second, Iqbal engages with Spengler's specific classification of Islam as 'Magian.' Spengler groups Islam with Judaism, ancient Chaldean religion, early Christianity, and Zoroastrianism under a single cultural rubric characterised by cosmic dualism (Good vs. Evil), messianic expectation, and a fatalistic attitude toward time. Iqbal makes a crucial concession: 'that a Magian crust has grown over Islam, I do not deny.' But he insists that this Magian overlay is precisely what his lectures have been stripping away — the purpose of the Reconstruction is 'to secure a vision of the spirit of Islam as emancipated from its Magian overlayings.' Spengler's error is to mistake the overlay for the essence.

Third, Iqbal identifies two specific points on which Spengler's Magian classification fails. The Magian religions admitted the existence of false gods (they merely refused to worship them); Islam denies the very existence of false gods — a categorical difference, not merely a difference of degree. And the Magian religions are characterised by 'a perpetual attitude of expectation' — the coming Messiah, the unborn sons of Zoroaster, the Paraclete — whereas Islam's doctrine of finality is precisely a 'psychological cure' for this expectation. Finality does not look forward to a coming saviour; it declares that the era of prophetic guidance is complete and that humanity must now rely on its own rational resources. Ibn Khaldūn, Iqbal notes, 'fully criticized and finally demolished' the Mahdist idea that had reappeared in Islam under Magian influence.

This concluding section is architecturally essential. It connects the internal argument of Lecture V (the anti-classical thesis, the Muslim contributions to empirical science and historical consciousness) to the external challenge that the lecture was designed to answer: the European denial that Islamic civilisation made any genetic contribution to modernity. Spengler is the most sophisticated form of this denial, and Iqbal's response is not merely to rebut him but to demonstrate that the evidence assembled in Sections 1–13 renders his thesis untenable.

Original text

It now remains to eradicate a grave misunderstanding created by Spengler's widely read book, The Decline of the West. His two chapters devoted to the problem of Arabian culture⁵⁴ constitute a most important contribution to the cultural history of Asia. They are, however, based on a complete misconception of the nature of Islam as a religious movement, and of the cultural activity which it initiated. Spengler's main thesis is that each culture is a specific organism, having no point of contact with cultures that historically precede or follow it. Indeed, according to him, each culture has its own peculiar way of looking at things which is entirely inaccessible to men belonging to a different culture. In his anxiety to prove this thesis he marshals an overwhelming array of facts and interpretations to show that the spirit of European culture is through and through anti-classical. And this anti-classical spirit of European culture is entirely due to the specific genius of Europe, and not to any inspiration she may have received from the culture of Islam which, according to Spengler, is thoroughly 'Magian' in spirit and character. Spengler's view of the spirit of modern culture is, in my opinion, perfectly correct. I have, however, tried to show in these lectures that the anti-classical spirit of the modern world has really arisen out of the revolt of Islam against Greek thought.⁵⁵ It is obvious that such a view cannot be acceptable to Spengler; for, if it is possible to show that the anti-classical spirit of modern culture is due to the inspiration which it received from the culture immediately preceding it, the whole argument of Spengler regarding the complete mutual independence of cultural growths would collapse. I am afraid Spengler's anxiety to establish this thesis has completely perverted his vision of Islam as a cultural movement.

By the expression 'Magian culture' Spengler means the common culture associated with what he calls 'Magian group of religions',⁵⁶ i.e. Judaism, ancient Chaldean religion, early Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and Islam. That a Magian crust has grown over Islam, I do not deny. Indeed my main purpose in these lectures has been to secure a vision of the spirit of Islam as emancipated from its Magian overlayings which, in my opinion, have misled Spengler. His ignorance of Muslim thought on the problem of time, as well as of the way in which the 'I', as a free centre of experience, has found expression in the religious experience of Islam, is simply appalling.⁵⁷ Instead of seeking light from the history of Muslim thought and experience, he prefers to base his judgement on vulgar beliefs as to the beginning and end of time. Just imagine a man of overwhelming learning finding support for the supposed fatalism of Islam in such Eastern expressions and proverbs as the 'vault of time',⁵⁸ and 'everything has a time!'⁵⁹

'The kernel of the prophetic teaching,' says Spengler, 'is already Magian. There is one God — be He called Yahweh,⁶⁰ Ahuramazda, or Marduk-Baal — who is the principle of good, and all other deities are either impotent or evil. To this doctrine there attached itself the hope of a Messiah, very clear in Isaiah, but also bursting out everywhere during the next centuries, under pressure of an inner necessity. It is the basic idea of Magian religion, for it contains implicitly the conception of the world-historical struggle between Good and Evil, with the power of Evil prevailing in the middle period, and the Good finally triumphant on the Day of Judgement.' If this view of the prophetic teaching is meant to apply to Islam it is obviously a misrepresentation. The point to note is that the Magian admitted the existence of false gods; only they did not turn to worship them. Islam denies the very existence of false gods. In this connexion Spengler fails to appreciate the cultural value of the idea of the finality of prophethood in Islam. No doubt, one important feature of Magian culture is a perpetual attitude of expectation, a constant looking forward to the coming of Zoroaster's unborn sons, the Messiah, or the Paraclete of the fourth gospel. I have already indicated the direction in which the student of Islam should seek the cultural meaning of the doctrine of finality in Islam. It may further be regarded as a psychological cure for the Magian attitude of constant expectation which tends to give a false view of history. Ibn Khaldūn, seeing the spirit of his own view of history, has fully criticized and, I believe, finally demolished the alleged revelational basis in Islam of an idea similar, at least in its psychological effects, to the original Magian idea which had reappeared in Islam under the pressure of Magian thought.⁶¹

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13. Time, creative movement, and the anti-classical spirit

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