Iqbal pivots from the Turkish case study to the direct question 'Is the Law of Islam capable of evolution?' and marshals preliminary evidence — the hundred theological systems that bloomed in the classical period, the nineteen early legal schools, and the absence of any written law apart from the Qur'an before the Abbasids. Most importantly, he observes that the early schools 'gradually passed from the deductive to the inductive attitude,' introducing empirical responsiveness into legal thought.
Section 9 issued the warning that counterbalances the preceding six sections' advocacy of ijtihād: liberalism, if unchecked, becomes a force of disintegration, and Islamic reform must proceed with 'self-control and clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social polity.' Section 10 now pivots from the Turkish case study — which has occupied Sections 4–9 — to the direct examination of the question Section 8 posed: is the Law of Islam capable of evolution? This section is transitional in character: it frames the question, marshals preliminary evidence from European Orientalist scholarship, and lays out the structural observations that will govern the detailed examination of the four sources of Islamic law in Sections 11–14.
The section advances through four movements. First, Iqbal introduces the German Orientalist Max Horten's argument that the history of Islam is 'a gradual interaction, harmony, and mutual deepening' of Aryan culture and Semitic religion — and that between 800 and 1100 CE, 'not less than one hundred systems of theology appeared in Islam,' demonstrating the extraordinary elasticity of Islamic thought. Second, he cites Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's observation that Muslim jurists simultaneously condemn each other as heretics and work to reconcile the quarrels of their predecessors — a paradox that reveals the tradition's internal dynamism beneath its apparent rigidity. Third, Iqbal makes three preliminary observations: that no written law existed apart from the Qur'an until the rise of the Abbasids; that nineteen schools of law appeared between the mid-first and early fourth Islamic centuries; and that these schools 'gradually passed from the deductive to the inductive attitude' in their interpretive efforts. Fourth, he announces the programme for the remaining sections: a discussion of the 'four accepted sources of Muhammadan Law' — the Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijmāʿ, and Qiyās — through which the possibility of further evolution will be demonstrated.
The section's most important intellectual contribution is the third observation: the claim that the early legal schools moved from deductive to inductive reasoning. This is a compressed but far-reaching argument. Deductive reasoning proceeds from general principles to specific applications; inductive reasoning proceeds from specific cases and observations to general principles. The shift Iqbal describes — from applying Qur'anic principles deductively to studying 'local conditions of life and habits of new peoples' and reasoning inductively from these conditions — is, in effect, the introduction of empirical responsiveness into legal thought. It is the jurisprudential equivalent of the shift from Greek rationalism to empirical science that Lecture V traced in the development of Muslim natural philosophy. And it is the methodological foundation of the 'evolution' Iqbal is about to argue for: law evolves not by abandoning its principles but by inductively engaging new circumstances and allowing those circumstances to generate new applications of permanent principles.