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Iqbal takes up the ḥadīth — the second source of Islamic law — and makes one of his most daring hermeneutic moves. Drawing on Shāh Walī Allāh's theory of prophetic method, he argues that the legal traditions embody context-specific applications of universal principles rather than universal prescriptions, and reinterprets Abū Ḥanīfah's reluctance to rely on ḥadīth as a principled recognition of Islam's universal character rather than an accident of unavailable collections.
Section 11 examined the first of the four sources of Islamic law — the Qur'an — establishing the foundational hermeneutic principle that the Qur'an is not a legal code but an 'awakener' of consciousness, that its legal provisions must be read systemically, and that each generation must be 'guided but unhampered' by the work of its predecessors. Section 12 now takes up the second source: the ḥadīth (prophetic traditions). This is among the most intellectually daring sections of the entire Reconstruction, because Iqbal's treatment of the ḥadīth directly challenges the authority of a source that orthodox Sunnī Islam has placed almost on a par with the Qur'an itself.
The section advances through four connected arguments. First, Iqbal introduces the modern European critical evaluation of the ḥadīth corpus — Goldziher's sweeping scepticism on one side and the more measured conclusion of an unnamed European writer (likely Aghnides) on the other — establishing that critical engagement with ḥadīth is a legitimate scholarly activity rather than a heretical betrayal. Second, and most importantly, Iqbal introduces Shāh Walī Allāh's theory of prophetic method: the argument that the Prophet's legislative activity was addressed to a specific people in specific circumstances, that the resulting legal rulings (aḥkām) are 'in a sense specific to that people,' and that 'since their observance is not an end in itself they cannot be strictly enforced in the case of future generations.' This is a radical hermeneutic principle from within the Islamic tradition itself — not imported from European criticism but articulated by one of the most revered scholars of the subcontinent.
Third, Iqbal uses Shāh Walī Allāh's framework to reinterpret Abū Ḥanīfah's famous reluctance to rely on ḥadīth — arguing that this reluctance was not (as commonly claimed) due to the unavailability of collections but to a principled recognition of the 'universal character of Islam' that made the mechanical application of Arabia-specific traditions inappropriate. Fourth, Iqbal closes with a careful balance: the traditionists performed 'the greatest service to the Law of Islam' by insisting on the value of the concrete case against abstract thinking, and further study of ḥadīth literature can illuminate 'the spirit in which the Prophet himself interpreted his Revelation' — but this study must be critical and intelligent, not indiscriminate.
The section's architecture is characteristic of Iqbal's method throughout Lecture VI: a radical conclusion (the legal ḥadīth cannot be mechanically enforced on future generations) is grounded in the authority of recognised figures within the tradition (Shāh Walī Allāh, Abū Ḥanīfah), balanced by genuine acknowledgement of what the opposing position gets right (the value of concrete cases), and directed toward a constructive programme (using ḥadīth to understand the spirit of prophetic interpretation rather than as a source of binding rulings).