←IndexThe Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam

Lecture 6: The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam

Section 6 of 14

The Religious Reform Party and the Caliphate question

Section summary

In brief

Iqbal turns to Turkey's Religious Reform Party and its Grand Vizier Saʿīd Ḥalīm Pasha, whose vision of Islam as a universal system distorted by local pre-Islamic accretions provides a more authentically Islamic route to the same reformist conclusions. He then applies this substantive ijtihād to the Caliphate, endorsing the Turkish position that the institution need not be vested in a single person but can legitimately reside in an elected assembly.

Sections 4 and 5 examined the Turkish Nationalist Party's position — the separation of Church and State — and Iqbal's metaphysical critique of it as a Christian import inapplicable to Islam. Section 6 now turns to the second current of Turkish thought: the Religious Reform Party, led by the Grand Vizier Saʿīd Ḥalīm Pasha, which reaches 'practically the same conclusion' as the Nationalists — the freedom of ijtihād to rebuild the Sharīʿah — but through a 'line of thought more in tune with the spirit of Islam.' The section then applies this reformist ijtihād to the most consequential institutional question in modern Islam: the Caliphate.

The section advances through four movements. First, Iqbal presents Saʿīd Ḥalīm Pasha's argument that Islam, as a 'unity of the eternal verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity,' is universal and has no fatherland — just as there is no 'English Mathematics' or 'German Astronomy,' there is no Turkish, Arabian, or Indian Islam. The universality of Islamic principles generates varieties of national cultures, but the principles themselves transcend national boundaries. The Grand Vizier diagnoses the central problem: Islamic moral and social ideals have been 'gradually deislamized' through local pre-Islamic influences, and the 'pure brow of the principle of Tawḥīd has received an impress of heathenism.' The remedy is to strip away this 'hard crust' and rediscover the original principles.

Second, Iqbal pivots from diagnosis to institutional application: how has the Grand National Assembly exercised ijtihād regarding the Caliphate? The Turkish position is that the Caliphate need not be vested in a single person but can be vested in 'a body of persons, or an elected Assembly' — a position Iqbal endorses as 'perfectly sound' and 'thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam.'

Third, Iqbal grounds this position in Ibn Khaldūn's classification of three views on the Universal Caliphate: that it is divinely mandated, that it is a matter of expediency, or that it is unnecessary. Turkey, he argues, has shifted from the first to the second view — the Muʿtazilite position that the Caliphate is expedient rather than divinely required — and has done so on the basis of historical experience: the idea of a Universal Caliphate 'has failed in practice,' has prevented rather than promoted Muslim unity, and has become 'a mere symbol of a power which departed long ago.'

Fourth, Iqbal invokes the precedent of Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, who dropped the condition that the Caliph must be from the Quraysh tribe when the Quraysh lost political power, and of Ibn Khaldūn himself, who acknowledged that when the Quraysh can no longer rule, the 'most powerful man' in a given territory must be accepted as Imām. This pragmatic adaptation of legal theory to historical reality is, for Iqbal, an exemplary instance of ijtihād — 'inspired by the realities of experience, and not by the scholastic reasoning of jurists who lived and thought under different conditions of life.'

This section is pivotal because it demonstrates what substantive ijtihād looks like in practice: not merely the assertion of the right to think independently (the Wahhābī limitation identified in Section 3) but the actual exercise of independent judgement on a major institutional question, grounded in historical analysis, responsive to changed circumstances, and justified by appeal to recognised authorities within the tradition itself.

Original text

The Religious Reform Party, on the other hand, led by Saʿīd Ḥalīm Pasha, insisted on the fundamental fact that Islam is a harmony of idealism and positivism; and, as a unity of the eternal verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity, has no fatherland. 'As there is no English Mathematics, German Astronomy or French Chemistry,' says the Grand Vizier, 'so there is no Turkish, Arabian, Persian or Indian Islam. Just as the universal character of scientific truths engenders varieties of scientific national cultures which in their totality represent human knowledge, much in the same way the universal character of Islamic verities creates varieties of national, moral and social ideals.'

Modern culture based as it is on national egoism is, according to this keen-sighted writer, only another form of barbarism. It is the result of an over-developed industrialism through which men satisfy their primitive instincts and inclinations. He, however, deplores that during the course of history the moral and social ideals of Islam have been gradually deislamized through the influence of local character, and pre-Islamic superstitions of Muslim nations. These ideals today are more Iranian, Turkish, or Arabian than Islamic. The pure brow of the principle of Tawḥīd has received more or less an impress of heathenism, and the universal and impersonal character of the ethical ideals of Islam has been lost through a process of localization. The only alternative open to us, then, is to tear off from Islam the hard crust which has immobilized an essentially dynamic outlook on life, and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity with a view to rebuild our moral, social, and political ideals out of their original simplicity and universality.

Let us now see how the Grand National Assembly has exercised this power of Ijtihād in regard to the institution of Khilāfat. According to Sunnī Law, the appointment of an Imām or Khalīfah is absolutely indispensable. The first question that arises in this connexion is this — Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey's Ijtihād is that according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly. The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India, as far as I know, have not yet expressed themselves on this point. Personally, I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. The republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam.

In order to understand the Turkish view let us seek the guidance of Ibn Khaldūn — the first philosophical historian of Islam. Ibn Khaldūn, in his famous 'Prolegomena', mentions three distinct views of the idea of Universal Caliphate in Islam²³: (1) That Universal Imamate is a Divine institution, and is consequently indispensable. (2) That it is merely a matter of expediency. (3) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken by the Khawārij.²⁴ It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to the second view, i.e. to the view of the Muʿtazilah who regarded Universal Imamate as a matter of expediency only.

The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the idea of Universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent political units have arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam. Far from serving any useful purpose it has really stood in the way of a reunion of independent Muslim States. Persia has stood aloof from the Turks in view of her doctrinal differences regarding the Khilāfat; Morocco has always looked askance at them, and Arabia has cherished private ambition. And all these ruptures in Islam for the sake of a mere symbol of a power which departed long ago.

Why should we not, they can further argue, learn from experience in our political thinking? Did not Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī drop the condition of Qurashiyyat in the Khalīfah in view of the facts of experience, i.e. the political fall of the Quraysh and their consequent inability to rule the world of Islam? Centuries ago Ibn Khaldūn, who personally believed in the condition of Qurashiyyat in the Khalīfah, argued much in the same way. Since the power of the Quraysh, he says, has gone, there is no alternative but to accept the most powerful man as Imām in the country where he happens to be powerful. Thus Ibn Khaldūn, realizing the hard logic of facts, suggests a view which may be regarded as the first dim vision of an International Islam fairly in sight today. Such is the attitude of the modern Turk, inspired as he is by the realities of experience, and not by the scholastic reasoning of jurists who lived and thought under different conditions of life.

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5. The separation of Church and State — a Christian import

7. Ziya Gökalp's poetic vision and the international ideal

Original text